We argue and provide evidence that stock price synchronicity affects stock liquidity. Under the "relative synchronicity" hypothesis, higher return co-movement (i.e. higher systematic volatility relative to total volatility) improves liquidity. Under the "absolute synchronicity" hypothesis, stocks with higher systematic volatility or beta are more liquid. Our results support both hypotheses. We find all three illiquidity measures (effective proportional bidask spread, price impact measure and Amihud's illiquidity measure) are negatively related to stock return co-movement and systematic volatility. Besides market co-movement, larger industry wide component in returns also improves liquidity. We also find that improvement in liquidity following additions to the S&P 500 index is related to the stock's increase in return co-movement.
Introduction
Liquidity reflects the ability to trade large quantities of a security quickly, with minimal trading cost and little price impact. Extensive research has been conducted in understanding the cross-sectional and time-series variation of liquidity in the equity market. A key determinant of liquidity is the volatility of underlying stocks. An increase in volatility of underlying stock returns implies that the liquidity providers will face higher adverse selection risk due to increased possibility of trading with informed investors as well as higher inventory risk arising from order imbalances. As a result, higher asset price volatility leads to lower asset liquidity (see, for example, Stoll (1978) , Ho and Stoll (1981) , and Stoll (2000) ).
While existing studies show that an increase in volatility lowers liquidity, there is little research work on the separate effects of systematic volatility and idiosyncratic volatility on liquidity. According to the adverse selection models or inventory risk models, the effect of systematic volatility on liquidity should be different from that of idiosyncratic volatility, given that systematic risk can be hedged to a certain extent. Furthermore, Baruch, Karolyi and Lemmon (2007) and Baruch and Saar (2009) , for example, argue that stock return co-movement affects the trading activity of a stock and therefore its liquidity. This is because the correlation of stock returns with the market measures the amount of market-wide information relative to firm-specific information. While market makers can observe the market-wide information easily, it is more difficult for them to observe firm-specific information. When an individual stock is highly correlated with the market, market makers can rely more on the information he observes from the market movement so that the stock price adjustments are less sensitive to its own order flow.
Consequently, both liquidity and informed traders choose to trade a larger proportion of the crosslisted asset in the exchange with the higher return correlation with the domestic assets. That is, proportionally more volume migrates to the market in which the cross-listed asset has greater correlation with the other assets traded on the market.
1 Moreover, Subrahmanyam (1991) demonstrates that the introduction of basket of securities provides a preferred trading medium for uninformed liquidity traders, because adverse selection costs are typically lower in these markets 1 Bhushan (1991) and Caballe and Krishnan (1994) also show the market maker is able to extract greater amount of information from the order flow of other securities when the stock co-moves more with the market.
than in markets for individual securities. This is related to the idea that the basket of securities is affected mostly by systematic returns, as security specific returns are diversified away, and consequently, is more liquid.
We test for two empirical hypotheses in this paper. Our first hypothesis is the "relative synchronicity" hypothesis which predicts that stock return co-movement, or the R-square measure, positively affects the liquidity of a stock, as market makers learn more information from the market if the stock has more correlated fundamentals. The second hypothesis is the "absolute synchronicity" hypothesis which predicts that idiosyncratic volatility and systematic volatility have different effects on liquidity, as market makers can hedge away systematic risk to a certain extent.
Since a higher amount of market-wide information lowers the adverse selection risk, we expect that an increase in systematic volatility to be accompanied by an improvement in liquidity. We conduct empirical analysis based on a sample of NYSE stocks from 1989 to 2008, and construct various liquidity measures, including proportional effective bid-ask spread, Kyle's price impact measure and Amihud's illiquidity measure.
Our empirical evidence supports both hypotheses. For the "relative synchronicity"
hypothesis, we find that stock price synchronicity, a measure of stock return co-movement, has a negative relationship with all three illiquidity measures. For the "absolute synchronicity"
hypothesis, we also find that an increase in systematic volatility or market beta improves stock liquidity. Our results cannot be explained by cross-sectional differences in firm size, price levels, institutional ownership, turnover, and idiosyncratic volatility which we use as control variables.
We argue that our results are not due to the reverse causality from liquidity to stock return synchronicity, as there is a similar relationship between firm's earnings co-movement and liquidity. Our contention is that it is unlikely that stock liquidity drives the earnings synchronicity.
Based on market model regressions using accounting return on assets (ROA), we find that firms with higher earnings co-movement have higher stock liquidity, confirming the causal effect of comovement on liquidity.
We also show that the co-variation in returns at the industry level is positively related to liquidity: firms with greater industry-wide return co-movement in returns exhibit higher liquidity.
We also find a similar effect of higher industry-wide volatility and industry beta on stock liquidity.
These results support our contention that larger market or industry wide component in returns reduces the adverse selection risk faced by the liquidity providers and hence, improves the supply of liquidity. We demonstrate that the relationship between liquidity and stock price synchronicity is related to the extent of information asymmetry. When partitioning the sample into S&P 500 stocks versus non-S&P 500 stocks, we find that the relationship is stronger for non-S&P 500 stocks that have a higher degree of information asymmetry. Our results also shed light on the indexing effect, where firms in the major market index are likely to co-move more with the market and experience better liquidity. In fact, we show that for firms being added to the S&P 500 index, the improvement of the liquidity could be attributed to the increase in co-movement with the market.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a discussion of the effect of stock price synchronicity on liquidity. In Section 3 we describe the data and methodology used in the research.
Section 4 contains the basic results on the relationship between liquidity and stock price synchronicity, while Section 5 contains extended analysis. Section 6 provides the conclusion.
Effect of stock price synchronicity on liquidity
Stock price synchronicity, or the R-square measure, measures the proportion of systematic volatility relative to the total volatility or idiosyncratic volatility. In this section, we survey related literature and discuss the potential effects of stock price synchronicity on liquidity. There is an extensive literature that predicts a negative relationship between asset price volatility and asset liquidity (Stoll (1978) , Ho and Stoll (1981), and Stoll (2000) ). Previous studies, however, do not distinguish between systematic and idiosyncratic volatilities and examine how each type of volatility may affect liquidity differently. Existing theories suggest that the idiosyncratic volatility has a larger impact on liquidity than the systematic volatility. First, the adverse selection risk should primarily come from the idiosyncratic component. This is because while insiders or informed investors have advantages in collecting idiosyncratic (or firm-specific) information, it is more difficult for investors to possess a similar advantage with regards to the systematic (or market-wide) information. Second, the inventory risk is more likely to arise from the idiosyncratic volatility as market makers can hedge against the market risk using stock index futures or derivative products.
While there are strong theoretical and empirical support for the negative association between liquidity and idiosyncratic volatility 2 , very little is known about the relationship between liquidity and systematic volatility. In theory, the inventory risk associated with the market can be hedged completely and there is no adverse selection risk due to the market factor. In this case, market makers do not need compensation for providing liquidity on account of systematic risk, so that there is no effect of systematic risk on liquidity. In practice, market makers are unable to completely eliminate the market risk in their inventory control, because hedging against market risk is either costly or imperfect. As for the adverse selection risk, some of the private information that an insider obtains about a company might be relevant for the market as a whole. Therefore, even for the systematic component, the market makers need to protect themselves against adverse selection.
A number of previous studies document commonality in liquidity (Hasbrouck and Seppi (2001) and Huberman and Halka (2001) , and Chordia, Roll and Subrahmanyam (2000) ). These papers find that there are significant co-variations in liquidity among stocks. The existence of commonality in liquidity suggests that liquidity is driven by some common sources. For example, program trading of simultaneous large orders will exert common pressure on dealer inventories.
Furthermore, institutional investors with similar investing styles might exhibit correlated trading patterns, thereby inducing changes in inventory pressure across the broad market. When dealing with a portfolio of stocks, market makers have to prepare for unexpected common pressure on inventories in their liquidity provision. Therefore, we expect a negative impact of systematic risk of a stock on its liquidity, although it might not be as strong as the idiosyncratic risk.
Furthermore, according to Subrahmanyam (1991) , the amount of liquidity trading can be endogenous, as there are discretionary liquidity traders who will choose to trade in securities that have the least adverse selection risk. Since stocks of higher systematic information have less adverse selection, discretionary liquidity traders making portfolio adjustment can minimize the 2 Goyal and Santa-Clara (2003) provide empirical evidence on a positive relation between the idiosyncratic volatility and average stock returns. Bali, Cakici, Yan, Zhang (2005) , however, show that the idiosyncratic volatility might simply proxy for liquidity, so that the empirical evidence documented in Goyal and SantaClara (2003) is a reflection of liquidity premium. Spiegel and Wang (2005) also show that idiosyncratic risk and liquidity are negatively correlated.
liquidity cost by concentrating their trades in these stocks, resulting in a further improvement of liquidity.
So far, our discussion has been on the differential impact of systematic volatility and idiosyncratic volatility on liquidity. A couple of papers (Baruch, Karolyi and Lemmon (2007)) and Baruch and Saar (2009) ) examine the stock return co-movement, or the amount of marketwide volatility relative to firm-specific volatility, and demonstrate that it affects the trading volume and thereby the liquidity of a stock. These papers build theoretical models in which the market maker infers information based on order flows. The higher the return co-movement of a security, the more information the market maker is able to extract about the value of the security from the order flows of other securities in the market. This decreases the adverse selection risks, increases the incentives to trade the security, and lowers the sensitivity of the asset price to its own order flow. Hence, return co-movement is positively related to liquidity of the asset. Baruch and Saar (2009) show that a stock is more liquid when it is listed on a market where "similar" securities are traded, or when it has a higher correlation with other securities. They find that stocks that switch their listing from NASDAQ to the NYSE have return patterns more similar to securities already listed on the NYSE. They also document liquidity improvements for the switching firms that are positively related to the degree of similarity in the return patterns. Baruch, Karolyi and Lemmon (2007) show the distribution of the trading volume across international stock exchanges is related to the correlation of the cross-listed asset returns that arise in the respective markets. Based on a sample of non-US stocks cross-listed on major U.S. exchanges, they find that volume migrates to the exchange in which there is a greater correlation between the cross-listed asset returns and returns on other assets traded in the market.
We postulate two hypotheses based on the above discussions. The first is the "relative synchronicity" hypothesis. Under this hypothesis, stocks with a higher degree of co-movement (i.e. a higher proportion of systematic volatility) are more liquid. The rationale for the prediction is the learning effect as described in Baruch, Karolyi, and Lemmon (2007) and Baruch and Saar (2009) , whereby learning about the information that drives the asset's price improves liquidity. This hypothesis predicts a positive relationship between stock return co-movement and liquidity.
The second is the "absolute synchronicity" hypothesis. Under this hypothesis, what affects liquidity is the amount of systematic volatility and idiosyncratic volatility. This hypothesis predicts that after holding idiosyncratic volatility constant, higher systematic volatility enhances liquidity.
We will conduct empirical tests of these two empirical hypotheses in the following sections.
Data and Methodology
The sample consists of all NYSE listed ordinary common stocks, identified by the Center for We construct several different proxies of firm level liquidity used in the prior literature. The first measure of liquidity is the price-impact measure (  ) introduced in Kyle (1985) . For each firm, we use the price and quote information from TAQ to classify every trade as buyer (seller) initiated, based on whether the transaction price is greater (lower) than the prevailing average of bid and ask quotes. Specifically, we follow the algorithm presented in Lee and Ready (1991) in signing the transactions as buy and sell orders, matching trading records to the most recent quote preceding the trade by at least five seconds. We aggregate the buy and sell orders at the daily level and compute firm i's net order imbalance at day t, OIB i,t , defined as the difference between the value of daily buyer and seller initiated trades.
Our estimate of  for firm i is the coefficient from the following regression,
where R i,t is the return on stock i on day t. Equation (1) specifies that the stock price responds to the net order imbalance. We have also estimated Equation (1) by adding the return on the market portfolio as an additional explanatory variable and obtain similar results. Therefore, the effect of net order imbalance on the stock returns, as measured by , is not affected when we control for the effect of market movement.
For each year, we estimate the daily price impact coefficient by regressing daily returns on its corresponding order imbalance. Using a similar measure, Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1996) find that the price impact measure of liquidity is positively related to average stock returns, suggesting that illiquid stocks are compensated with liquidity premium. Besides estimating based on Equation (1), we also do the estimation using a transaction-based measure and obtain similar results.
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Our second liquidity measure is the effective bid-ask spread. Stoll (1978) , Glosten and Harris (1988) and others show that bid-ask spreads include an adverse selection costs of the market maker trading with investors with superior information. We calculate the proportional effective spread based on two times the absolute difference between the trade execution price and the midquote, divided by the midquote. The daily average proportional effective spreads for firm i are averaged each calendar year to generate our annual spread measure (ESPR i ).
The third liquidity measure is based on Amihud (2002) and does not rely on intraday transactions data. It is calculated as the absolute daily return on stock i divided by the firm's daily dollar volume. Using this measure of the relative price change associated with trading volume, Amihud (2002) finds that firms with greater illiquidity earn higher expected returns, consistent with an illiquidity premium in returns. Acharya and Pedersen (2005) also use this illiquidity measure to investigate the effect of liquidity on security returns. Hasbrouck (2009) shows that the Amihud illiquidity measure is a robust measure of price impact as posited in Kyle (1985) .
It should be noted that the three measures are in fact illiquidity measures. If a stock is less liquid, it will have a higher bid-ask spread, its order flow will have a larger impact on stock prices, 5 We estimate a transaction-based measure of Kyle's as an alternative. Here, we follow the approach of Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1996) : let p j and q j denote the price and the signed quantity of the order fulfilled for transaction j, and D j denote the sign of the order. The regression provides the estimates for the Kyle's . It is common practice to use = (p j -p j-1 )/p j-1 as the regressor to ensure that our comparison of the price impact estimate across different stocks is not affected by the price level. We repeat our analysis using the transaction-based price impact measure for the period 1989-2003 and obtain qualitatively similar results.
and the absolute price change per unit of volume is greater. Therefore, an increase of any of these measures is an indication of lower liquidity.
To investigate the relation between liquidity and the amount of market-wide information, we rely on the standard market model regressions to extract the market-wide component in returns.
We start with the regression of weekly stock returns on stock i at week w (R i,w ) on the CRSP valueweighted weekly market returns (R mkt,w ):
, where we include one week lead and lag of market returns to account for any delayed adjustment in stock prices to market-wide information. Note that this is a standard market model, and does not include the net order imbalance as the explanatory variable like Equation (1) Table 1 reports the unconditional correlations across firm-years among R-square, beta, the liquidity proxies, and other firm specific characteristics that we use as control variables.
In general, all the liquidity measures are highly correlated with each other, a result consistent with Korajczyk and Sadka (2008) and Hasbrouck (2009) . We find that the daily price impact coefficient is highly correlated with both the effective spread and Amihud illiquidity. The Rsquared measure is highly correlated with stock's beta and idiosyncratic volatility, with a correlation coefficient of 36% and -30%, respectively. It is noted that the correlation of total volatility with idiosyncratic volatility is 98%, and therefore the cross-sectional variation of firm volatility is primarily driven by the firm-specific component. Finally, the correlation of liquidity measures with idiosyncratic volatility is higher than the correlations with the total volatility, providing preliminary evidence of the asymmetric effect of systematic volatility and idiosyncratic volatility on the liquidity.
Empirical Relationship between Liquidity and Stock Price Synchronicity

Explanatory Variables
Several studies show that cross-security variation in liquidity can be explained by firm characteristics. Stoll (1978 Stoll ( , 2000 , Ho and Stoll (1981) and Harris (1994) show that proportional bid-ask spreads are lower for bigger firms and high volume stocks as they are associated with higher probability of finding a counterparty to trade and hence are associated with lower inventory and order processing costs faced by the market maker. They also show that spreads are higher for stocks with high return variance due to compensation for inventory risks as well as the risk of trading with an informed trader. Hasbrouck (1991) reports that the price impact (and adverse selection risk) is higher for smaller firms. Breen, Hodrick and Korajczyk (2002) show that the price impact of trade is related to a number of firm specific variables, including firm's market capitalization, volume, absolute returns, and institutional ownership.
To test for the "relative synchronicity" hypothesis, we regress our liquidity measures on the proportion of systematic information in stock returns, measured by stock return synchronicity (Synch). To test for the "absolute synchronicity" hypothesis, we have a couple of empirical specifications. One specification incorporates both idiosyncratic volatility (IdioVol) and systematic volatility (SysVol) as explanatory variables in the regression model, so that we can directly compare their distinct effects on liquidity. In another specification, we use beta to measure the absolute amount of systematic information, while controlling for idiosyncratic volatility (IdioVol) in the regression model. The beta measure provides us with an alternative functional form in measuring systematic risk.
We introduce a set of control variables that other studies have shown to affect firm level liquidity, independent of the amount of market-wide information. The first is firm size (SIZE), which is equal to the log of market capitalization at the beginning of the year. Firm size is a proxy for adverse selection risk, which might affect the liquidity of the stock. The second variable is the institutional ownership (IO), or the percentage of the firm's equity held by institutional investors.
For each year, the institutional holdings are measured as of the end of the previous year. Since a higher institutional ownership is accompanied by more information disclosure and lower adverse selection risk, it should be accompanied by higher stock liquidity. The third is turnover, which is the ratio of daily trading volume to the number of shares outstanding, averaged over the year. By construction, since turnover is endogenously determined, it might capture the influences of other variables that explain our liquidity measures. Therefore, the effect of our synchronicity measures on the liquidity measures might be understated. The fourth variable is the inverse of price (1/P), where P is the beginning of year price for the firm. When liquidity is measured by proportional effective spread, it is possible that the cross-sectional variation in liquidity is affected by differences in the price levels. Hence, we include the inverse of price as a control variable if the dependent variable is proportional effective spread. Table 2 presents the results of the cross-sectional analysis, based on the fixed-effect panel regression, controlling for the time-trend in our liquidity measures. Panel A contains the results using effective proportional bid-ask spread as the dependent variable. The t-statistics, contained in parenthesis, are calculated using robust standard errors adjusted for firm and year clustering (see Petersen (2009)) . Results for the control variables are consistent with our conjecture. Proportional effective bid-ask spreads are negatively related to firm size, institutional ownership, turnover, and positively related to inverse of price level.
Basic Empirical Results
There is strong evidence in support of the "relative synchronicity" hypothesis. In the first specification, the synchronicity measure (Synch) is strongly and negatively related to the effective bid-ask spread. Therefore, an increase in the proportion of market-wide information in the stock prices increases its liquidity (lower bid-ask spread). There is also supporting evidence for the "absolute synchronicity" hypothesis. In the second specification, effective bid-ask spread is negatively related to the amount of systematic information based on Beta, and positively related to the idiosyncratic volatility (IdioVol). In the third specification, when we decompose the total risk into idiosyncratic volatility (IdioVol) and systematic volatility (SysVol), we find that the two volatilities have opposite effects on liquidity. While an increase in idiosyncratic volatility increases the bid-ask spread, an increase of systematic volatility decreases it. Therefore, instead of adversely affecting the liquidity, an increase in market-wide information actually attracts more liquidity trading, resulting in lower bid-ask spread. We have also partitioned the sample period into two sub-periods. We continue to find a negative relation between bid-ask spreads and synchronicity (measured by R-squared or beta), as well as different impacts of systematic volatility and idiosyncratic volatility on liquidity. Table 2 contains the results using the price impact coefficient as the dependent variable. Results are similar to those based on the effective bid-ask spread. Consistent with the "relative synchronicity" hypothesis, there is a significantly negative relationship between price impact and price synchronicity, indicating that price impact of trades is smaller for stocks with higher co-movement with the market. Also consistent with the "absolute synchronicity" hypothesis, the price impact coefficient is negatively related to beta, once the idiosyncratic volatility is controlled for. Finally, the effects of idiosyncratic volatility and systematic volatility are asymmetric. While an increase in idiosyncratic volatility increases the price impact coefficient, an increase of systematic volatility decreases it. The results are again robust in both sub-periods. Table 2 . Amihud illiquidity is lower for firms with higher stock return synchronicity. It is also lower for stocks of higher systematic volatility, and higher betas, after controlling for the idiosyncratic volatility. We also obtain similar results in the sub-period analysis.
Panel B of
In an unreported table available upon request, we apply the test statistics from Plosser, Schwert, and White (1982) to compare the inference from the three regression specifications. The PSW test is applied to each stock in our sample and we fail to reject the null hypothesis that the model is correctly specified for most of the stocks. When we measure liquidity using bid-ask spreads, we do not reject the null hypothesis for 87 to 91 percent of firms across the three model specifications. Similarly, we fail to reject the PSW specification test for more than 84 percent of the firms when liquidity is computed based on the price impact, and 82 percent of the firms when liquidity is computed based on Amihud illiquidity. This provides support for both the absolute synchronicity hypothesis and the relative synchronicity hypothesis.
Robustness Tests
4.3.1 Results based on changes in stock price synchronicity 6 We obtain similar results when the price-impact measure in equation (1) is re-estimated after including market returns as the explanatory variable.
One explanation for our findings is that stock price synchronicity reflects some firm characteristics being correlated with liquidity, other than firm size, institutional ownership and turnover that we control for in the regression analysis. The relationship between illiquidity and stock price co-movement or systematic volatility could be a reflection of omitted firm characteristics. As a robustness check, we employ an alternative set of empirical specifications investigating the relationship using changes in liquidity and changes in explanatory variables. Each year, we compute changes in stock return synchronicity, beta, systematic volatility, idiosyncratic volatility, as well as changes in control variables, and estimate the following specifications for the cross-sectional time-series observations:
Results are reported in Table 3 . Consistent with our regression results using the levels, we find that changes in stock price synchronicity ( ) is negatively related to changes in illiquidity measures, regardless of whether effective spreads, price impact and Amihud illiquidity measures are used. In other words, after a firm experiences an increase in stock price synchronicity, the stock will experience an improvement in liquidity. This evidence is in support of the relative synchronicity hypothesis. In the second specification, after controlling for the change of idiosyncratic volatility ( ), the change in beta ( ) is negatively correlated with our illiquidity variables. Therefore, the result also supports the absolute synchronicity hypothesis. The third specification uses the change in SysVol ( ) and we obtain similar evidence only when liquidity is measured by change in spreads. We obtain less statistically significant results when we use change in Amihud illiquidity or a change in price impact measures. In the latter specifications, the change of idiosyncratic volatility ( ) remains statistically significant, but the change of systematic volatility is not. Overall, the negative relationship between illiquidity and stock price synchronicity also holds using changes in the explanatory variables, with stronger support for the relative synchronicity hypothesis.
Results based on frequently traded stocks
Another explanation for the evidence that illiquid stocks have lower co-movement with the market is that betas are underestimated due to thin trading problem. For those illiquid stocks that have higher bid-ask spread, higher price impact and higher Amihud illiquidity, they will tend to have lower beta and lower systematic volatility. We do not think that such an explanation is likely, as our beta and R-square estimates already adjust for delayed adjustments due to thin or nonsynchronous trading using the leading and lagging market returns.
Besides the thin trading, if large price impact and transaction costs discourage trading, this can give rise to another mechanism through which the liquidity affects the stock return synchronicity. Here, large transaction costs deter arbitrageurs from trading in the stock, while other stocks are moving due to common information. Consequently, for these illiquid stocks, their prices adjust only to large deviations from fundamental values, and hence, their synchronicity with the market will be lower. As a robustness test, Panel A of Table 4 presents additional analysis based on stocks that do not have any zero trading volume days in the year. In this way, we eliminate the illiquid stocks and conduct our investigation on stocks that are less prone to the infrequent trading problem. We also examine the impact of removing stocks that have low number of trades each day, and require that stocks have at least an average of 10 trades per day. The results are presented in Panel B of Table 4 . Results in Table 4 are generally similar to those in Table 2 , except that the relation between Amihud illiquidity and systematic volatility becomes marginally significant.
Results based on earnings co-movement
It is possible that the relationship we observe in Table 2 may not necessarily reflect causality running from stock return synchronicity or systematic volatility to liquidity. Instead, one can imagine a mechanism for the reverse causality from liquidity to stock return synchronicity. For example, liquid stocks are more likely to trade first upon the arrival of market-wide information, so that the more liquid stocks will have a higher return co-movement with the market, resulting in a higher R 2 . Furthermore, even if there is no reverse causality from liquidity to return synchronicity, there might be missing factors that simultaneously drive both liquidity and return synchronicity. For example, some stocks are more prone to investor sentiment, so that when the sentiment is high, there are a lot more trading for these stocks (Baker and Stein (2004) ), which also experience higher stock return synchronicity (Barberis, Shleifer and Wurgler (2005) ). To summarize, since it is possible that stock return synchronicity is endogenously determined, either by liquidity or other missing factors, one cannot ascertain if the empirical relationship that we report really reflects the effect of synchronicity on liquidity.
To address this issue, we construct co-movement measures based on accounting earnings as an instrumental variable for stock price synchronicity. The earnings co-movement measure reflects the co-movement of an individual firm's quarterly earnings with the aggregate market earnings.
Unlike the stock return synchronicity, the earnings co-movement measure, which depends on the behavior of fundamental earnings, is more likely to be exogenous, and can therefore allow us to make an unambiguous interpretation of the causal relationship.
The construction of the earnings co-movement measure is as follows. First, for each firm, we obtain quarterly earnings (NIQ) and total asset (ATQ ) from Compustat, and calculate return-onasset (ROA) for each quarter, which is defined as the firm's quarterly earning divided by the firm's total asset (NIQ/ATQ). By defining ROA i.q as the ROA of firm i in quarter q, ROA m.q as the valueweighted market-average ROA in quarter q, the firm's earnings co-movement is estimated by the following regression:
We include one lead and two lags of quarterly market ROA observations to control for any seasonality in the earnings pattern. Each year, for every stock, the quarterly ROA regression is estimated based on a five-year moving window. For example, if the stock-year observation is 1990, the regression is based on the quarterly ROA from 1986 to 1990. We require at least 20 valid observations in each quarterly ROA regression. We exclude the financial firms in our sample as their ROA may not be comparable due to differences in leverage. About 62% of the stocks in our original sample meet these requirements. The firm's earning's co-movement is measured by earnings synchronicity, which is the logit-transformation of the R-square from Equation (5). The average (time series average of cross-sectional averages) of earnings R-square is 32%.
We then use the firm's earnings co-movement as the independent variable, instead of the stock return synchronicity measure. Results are reported in Table 5 , where we regress the different stock's liquidity measures on the firm's earnings co-movement measure, in addition to the control variables. In the first two specifications, we use bid-ask spread and price impact as the dependent variables, and find the coefficients of earnings synchronicity to be negative and statistically significant. This indicates that a stock experiences less illiquidity when the earnings co-movement is higher. The evidence is slightly weaker in the last specification when the Amihud's illiquidity measure is used -the coefficient of earnings synchronicity is significantly negative in the univariate regression, but insignificant in the multivariate regression when other control variables are included. But overall, results in Table 5 confirm that there is causality going from (fundamental) return co-movement to the liquidity.
Extension of Analysis
Co-movement due to Industry Effects
Since our focus is on the impact of systematic information on liquidity, we also examine the influence of industry-wide information, separate from market returns. We ask whether greater industry-wide information also attracts liquidity trading, which results in further improvement of liquidity. We do this by computing the beta and synchronicity measures based on a two-factor model with market and industry factors, and compare them with those based on a one-factor market model. We denote model S as the one-factor model, and model T as the two-factor model:
Model S:
Model T:
where R ind,j,w refers to weekly returns on industry portfolio j corresponding to firm i in week w,(where firm i belongs to industry j, for j=1,..,17, constructed using the Fama and French 17-industry classification) and R mkt,j,w is the return on the market portfolio excluding industry j. In the two-factor model, Beta mkt,i and Beta IND,i represent the market and industry betas, so that we could examine their separate effects on the liquidity measures. We also derive the incremental effect on stock price synchronicity due to industry-wide return co-movement. If we denote R 2 from Model S and Model T as R 2 S and R 2 T , respectively, we can take the log-difference in regression R-square from the two-factor and single-factor market models: 
Results are presented in Table 6 . The evidence shows there is an additional effect on liquidity coming from industry-level co-movement. The incremental synchronicity due to industry effect (ln(R 2 diff )) has a negative and statistically significant effect on all three illiquidity measures. This suggests that after controlling for co-movement with market returns, a security with a higher industry co-movement induces a further improvement in liquidity. Likewise, the industry beta Beta IND,i negatively affects illiquidity and the effect is statistically significant in all different specifications. In fact, the coefficients associated with Beta IND,i are comparable in magnitude to the coefficients associated with Beta mkt,i . For example, in the specification based on effective bid-ask spread, the coefficient of Beta IND,i is -9.78, which, in fact, is larger in magnitude than the coefficient of Beta mkt,i (-8.53 ). Likewise, in the specification based on price impact, the coefficient of Beta IND,i is -1.02, and is comparable in magnitude than the coefficient of Beta mkt,i (-1.03 ). This result indicates that the industry co-movement is as important as market co-movement, in the sense that both can help to improve stock liquidity. Even if a stock does not co-move much with the market, but if the return fluctuation has a large industry-wide component, this could enhance the stock liquidity. The incremental systematic volatility due to industry effect (SysVol diff,i ) is negative, and statistically significant in the specification based on effective bid-ask spread and Amihud illiquidity measure, but is not significant in the specification based on price impact measure.
Overall, the evidence in Table 6 provides support for the incremental effect of "relative" and "absolute" synchronicity with industry returns on liquidity.
Comparison between S&P 500 and Non-S&P 500 stocks
We attribute the relationship between stock price synchronicity and liquidity to the adverse selection faced by liquidity providers. Such a relationship should not be uniform across stocks, but be stronger (weaker) when the degree of information asymmetry is higher (lower). We partition the stocks into two sub-samples, one based on S&P 500 stocks and the other based on non-S&P stocks, and investigate whether there is any difference between the two. Compared with S&P 500 stocks, non-S&P 500 stocks have less analyst coverage and smaller institutional ownership and are subject to a higher degree of information asymmetry. We therefore expect that the relationship between stock price synchronicity and liquidity to be more pronounced for non-S&P 500 stocks than for S&P 500 stocks.
We obtain data on the list of firms which belong to the S&P 500 index from Compustat. We use the yearly variable S&P Primary Index Marker (CPSPIN) to identify stocks which are included in the S&P 500 index at the beginning of each year. We then pool all stocks together in the regression analysis but include a dummy variable (NSP Dummy) that is equal to one for the observations of non-S&P 500 stocks, and 0 otherwise. In the regression, we will then interact the dummy variable with other explanatory variables to investigate any differential effect between S&P 500 stocks and non-S&P 500 stocks.
Results are presented in Table 7 . In all specifications, we find that the negative relationship between stock price synchronicity and illiquidity measures is more pronounced for the non-S&P 500 stocks. Regardless of which illiquidity measure we use, the interaction terms involving Synch, Beta, and SysVol are all significantly negative. Therefore, the effect of return synchronicity on illiquidity is bigger for non-S&P 500 stocks, and this is consistent with our conjecture that these stocks have a higher degree of information asymmetry. Furthermore, it is noted that the main effect of beta and SysVol becomes insignificant when the interaction terms are included. This implies that most of the main effect of synchronicity on liquidity is driven by the non-S&P 500 stocks.
Liquidity Impact of Additions to S&P 500 Index
There is extensive evidence of higher stock return commonality and liquidity for index component stocks. Furthermore, after a stock is added to the index, it experiences an increase in trading volume and liquidity (Harris and Gural (1986) and Harford and Kaul (2005) ) as well as a higher beta or systematic co-movement (Vijh (1994) and Barberis, Shliefer and Wurgler (2005) ). Barberis, Shleifer and Wurgler (2005) also provide evidence that the increase in beta is not totally attributed to fundamental changes, but are also due to market-friction and investor sentiment. In this section, we examine whether the changes of liquidity and beta subsequent to addition to S&P 500 are related. Table 8 presents additional analysis based on stocks added to S&P 500 index during the period 1989 to 2003. Only stocks that are added to S&P 500 index will be eligible for inclusion in our analysis, with observations drawn from the year before and after the addition to the index. We regress the liquidity proxy for each security in the combined pre and post-addition years on different measures of market-wide information, control variables and a S&P dummy variable that is equal to zero (one) during the pre (post) index addition years. In the first specification, each of the illiquidity measures is regressed on the S&P dummy variable, and we find that the coefficient for the dummy variable is significantly negative, regardless of the illiquidity measures used. This confirms that the stock liquidity is higher after the stock is added to the index. In the second specification, we add the synchronicity measure as an additional explanatory variable. While synchronicity is significantly negatively related to different illiquidity measures, the coefficient associated with the dummy variable becomes weaker for all three illiquidity measures, suggesting that the higher liquidity in the post-addition period can be attributed to stock price synchronicity.
In the final specification where all control variables are included, the coefficients of the synchronicity measure continues to be significant while the S&P dummy variables become insignificant across all illiquidity measures. Overall, while we do not claim that our results fully account for the increased liquidity surrounding the index additions, part of the liquidity effects can be attributed to the increased co-movement with the market.
Conclusion
Recent literature has identified the negative relationship between volatility and liquidity.
However, the effect of systematic volatility on liquidity is unknown. In this paper, we argue that the stock price synchronicity (amount of systematic volatility relative to total volatility) affects the liquidity of the individual stocks. We propose two hypotheses on the effect of stock return synchronicity on liquidity. Under the "relative synchronicity" hypothesis, there is a positive relationship between stock return co-movement and liquidity. Under the "absolute synchronicity" hypothesis, the effect of systematic volatility on liquidity is different from that of idiosyncratic volatility.
We provide strong empirical evidence to support both hypotheses. For the "relative synchronicity" hypothesis, we find that all three illiquidity measures (bid-ask spreads, price impact and Amihud illiquidity) decrease with stock return co-movement. For the "absolute synchronicity" hypothesis, we find that stock illiquidity decreases with systematic volatility and increases with idiosyncratic volatility.
The relationship cannot be explained by the reverse causality from liquidity to stock return synchronicity, as we find a similar positive effect of firm's earnings co-movement on stock liquidity. We also find the effect on liquidity is not confined to co-movement with the market.
After controlling for the market returns, a higher co-movement of stock returns with the industry returns has significant positive effects on liquidity. Similarly, higher industry-wide volatility improves stock liquidity, beyond the effect of market-wide volatility. In addition, the effect of stock price synchronicity on liquidity is stronger for non-S&P 500 stocks than for S&P 500 stocks, suggesting that the extent of information asymmetry is higher for non-S&P 500 stocks. Our paper also sheds light on the change in co-movement and liquidity after stocks are added to S&P index.
Previous literature tends to treat them as separate issues. While one strand of research (for example, Vijh (1994) and Barberis, Shleifer and Wurgler (2005) ) examines the increase in comovement for stocks included in the index, another strand examines the effect on liquidity (Harris and Gural (1986) and Harford ad Kaul (1998) ). Our paper shows that the two effects might be indeed related, as the increase of R-square is related to the rise in liquidity for those stocks added to the S&P 500 index. Overall, our evidence suggests that the degree of stock return synchronicity has a significant impact on asset liquidity. We regress stock liquidity measures on stock return synchronicity (Synch), Beta, systematic volatility (SysVol), and other control variables, using yearly observations of individual firms, using fixed-effect panel regression method. Synch is the logit-transformation of R 2 from the market-model regression for each stock. Beta is the beta coefficient in the market-model regression. SysVol is measured by square root of the explained variation of the market-model regression.
A total of five control variables are included. Size is the log value of the firm's capitalization measured at the beginning of the year. IO is the percentage institutional ownership measured at the beginning of the year. Turnover is the daily number of shares traded divided by total shares outstanding in the year. IdioVol represents the standard deviation of the weekly residual returns from the market model. If the dependent variable is the proportional effective spread, we also include the inverse of the price level (1/P) of the stock at the beginning of the year.
The three firm-level liquidity measures are the proportional effective spreads, price impact, and Amihud illiquidity. The regression results based on the three liquidity measures are reported in Panels A, B, and C respectively. In each panel we provide the regression results based on the full sample period (1989 to 2008), and two sub-periods, 1989-1998, and 1999-2008 We regress yearly changes of stock liquidity measures on yearly changes of stock return synchronicity (Synch), Beta, systematic volatility (SysVol), and changes of other control variables, using the fixed-effect panel regression method. Synch is the logit-transformation of R 2 from the market-model regression for each stock. Beta is the beta coefficient in the market-model regression. SysVol is measured by square root of the explained variation of the market-model regression.
The three firm-level liquidity measures are the proportional effective spreads (ESPR), price impact, and Amihud illiquidity (Amihud) We regress stock liquidity measures on stock return synchronicity (Synch), Beta, systematic volatility (SysVol) and other control variables, based on the fixed-effect panel regression method. The sample consists of yearly observations of stocks that do not have any zero trading volume days in the year. Synch is the logit-transformation of R 2 from the market-model regression for each stock. Beta is the beta coefficient in the market-model regression. SysVol is measured by square root of the explained variation of the market-model regression.
The three firm-level liquidity measures are the proportional effective spreads, price impact, and Amihud illiquidity. The regression is based on the sample period from 1989 to 2008. The firm and year clustered tstatistics are reported in the parenthesis. We regress stock liquidity measures on earnings' co-movement measures and other control variables. To construct firm's earnings' co-movement measures, we regress quarterly return-on-asset (ROA) of an individual firm on one lead and two lags of quarterly value-weighted market average ROA. The firm's earning's co-movement is measured by earnings synchronicity, which is the logit-transformation of the Rsquare from the regression equation. The three firm-level liquidity measures are the proportional effective spreads, price impact, and Amihud illiquidity. A total of four control variables are included. Size is the log value of the firm's capitalization measured at the beginning of the year. IO is the percentage institutional ownership measured at the beginning of the year. Turnover is the daily number of shares traded divided by total shares outstanding in the year. IdioVol represents the standard deviation of the weekly residual returns from the market model. If the dependent variable is the proportional effective spread, we also include the inverse of the price level (1/P) of the stock at the beginning of the year. We regress stock liquidity measures on stock return synchronicity (Synch) and control variables, over the 52 weeks before and after addition to the S&P index. Synch is the logit-transformation of R 2 from the market-model regression for each stock. A total of four control variables are included. Size is the log value of the firm's capitalization measured at the beginning of the year. IO is the percentage institutional ownership measured at the beginning of the year. Turnover is the daily number of shares traded divided by total shares outstanding in the year. If the dependent variable is the proportional effective spread, we also include the inverse of the price level (1/P) of the stock at the beginning of the year. S&P Dummy takes on a value of zero (one) during the pre-and post S&P index addition periods. The three firm-level liquidity measures are the proportional effective spreads (ESPR), price impact, and Amihud illiquidity (Amihud) (-7.23 ) (-5.56 ) (-1.18) (1.31) 
